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1. Motivation and assumptions 
The analysis of economic growth is dominated by neoclassical aggregate models of 
exogenous and endogenous growth in equilibrium. This is also true for applications of growth 
theory to environmental problems and resource scarcity. Although these have generated many 
clear insights, they suffer from two problems. First, they do not address all relevant issues 
related to growth, because they omit certain elements in their description of reality: out of 
equilibrium processes; ‘choice’ between multiple equilibria; and, structural changes in the 
economy. The latter is the more surprising given that economic growth in reality hardly ever 
occurs without structural change. A second problem with growth theory is that it makes many 
assumptions that are convenient but erroneous, in which case its results are questionable at 
best. Representative agents, rational behavior, perfect information, an aggregate production 
function, growth in equilibrium, and reversible growth are all debatable, to say the least. 
Moreover, due to these assumptions certain policy relevant aspects disappear from the 
analysis. 
This chapter starts from a set of alternative assumptions, offered by evolutionary 
growth theory, which is part of evolutionary economics. The thematic core of evolutionary 
economics can be characterized in various ways: interaction of innovation and selection; 
changing populations of heterogeneous agents; the impact of economic distribution on 
economic dynamics; and agents characterized by adaptive routines and imitation. Attention is 
focused on the link between evolutionary growth theory and scarcity. The analysis of resource 
scarcity and environmental pollution in the framework of growth theory during the 1970s has 
entirely occurred within the domain of standard growth theory. Since the 1980s, growth has 
been studied from the perspective of evolutionary theories of growth and technical change. 
This has, however, hardly influenced environmental and resource economics. 
Evolutionary growth theory employs micro-level descriptions of populations of firms 
resulting in non-equilibrium, differential growth with continuous interaction between 
innovation and selection of diversity. This allows for a subtle, realistic, and really long-run 
relationship between resource scarcity, environmental conditions and economic growth. It can 
address the fact that growth virtually always goes along with changes in the underlying 
distributions of technologies and firms. The notion of coevolution is relevant for both 
historical and future growth analysis in that the economy is seen as adaptive to the 
environment and vice versa. It will further be shown that (co)evolutionary growth should not 
be equated to progress. Finally, evolution means that the link between a social optimum and a 
market equilibrium is lost, implying that optimal public policy – focusing on resource 
exploitation and environmental externalities – receives little attention in evolutionary 
economics. On the other hand, evolutionary theory is well able to address the dynamic 
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implications of population diversity and distribution issues, as well as policies for innovation 
incentives and (altering) selection forces. All these issues will receive attention here. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 discusses general 
characteristics of evolutionary systems and shortly reviews insights of evolutionary 
economics that are relevant to the present discussion. Section 3 considers evolutionary 
analysis in environmental and resource economics. Section 4 introduces evolutionary growth 
theories and compares these with neoclassical growth theories. Section 5 contains the core of 
the paper, which is an analysis of the relationship between growth and environment from an 
evolutionary perspective. Section 6 studies the question of whether growth can be considered 
as progress, and offers some policy suggestions. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Evolutionary economics 
Evolution, either genetic or non-genetic – as in economics –, involves a number of 
complementary core elements and processes (similar terms encountered in the biological and 
economic literature are shown between brackets): 
1. Diversity (variety, variation): populations of agents, strategies, products or technologies. 
2. Selection: processes that reduce existing diversity. 
3. Innovation (adoption): processes that generate new diversity. 
4. Inheritance (transmission): replication through reproduction or copying (imitation). It is 
the cause of durability and cumulative processes. 
5. Bounded rationality: individuals and organizations (groups) behave automatically 
according to adapted or selected habits and routines, they imitate others, and are myopic. 
 
Any evolutionary theory has to start from a population approach. This immediately clarifies 
an essential difference with traditional microeconomics, where the assumption of a 
representative agent is crucial. Contrary to common belief, such a microeconomics is not 
really as micro as is possible. In fact, evolutionary theories are ‘more micro’, because they 
describe populations with behavioral or technical diversity among individuals or firms. 
A population approach can be operationalized in three different ways (van den Bergh, 
2003). One is by way of aggregate variables, as is common in evolutionary game theory. This 
assumes that diversity is limited, or can be simplified, to sub-populations, each of which are 
assumed to be homogeneous. A second approach is by describing population distributions and 
changes therein. A third approach is disaggregate, and represents the most thorough micro-
approach imaginable. It takes the form of multi-agent systems, in which each individual is 
explicitly described and can be assigned unique features. The agents can be defined in a 
setting of entirely random interactions (‘gaseous cloud’) or systematic interactions through a 
network structure or a spatial grid (‘lattice’). Note that the traditional multi-agent (general 
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equilibrium) and multi-sector (macroeconomic) models in economics, which are based on 
complementary and representative agents, are essentially different from multi-agent 
population models. 
The fundamental mechanisms of any evolutionary process can be regarded as an 
‘accordion model’. It applies equally to genetic and non-genetic evolution. The basic idea is 
that evolution is both simple and powerful, being supported by opposite forces or causal 
processes. One force is the creation or generation of variation (or variety or diversity), which 
can be considered a disequilibrating force. A second force is selection or reduction of variety, 
which can be considered an equilibrating and directive force. The result of these opposite 
forces is similar to the movement of an accordion. Its dynamics depends crucially on the 
existing diversity and in turn changes it. The consequence of a sustained accordion movement 
is that structure and complexity emerge along a non-equilibrium dynamic path of change. 
This is nowadays best  illustrated by experiments with computer simulation models in the 
field of evolutionary computation and modelling, which show that surprisingly complex 
structures can be generated with rather simple models of interactive innovation and selection 
(Bäck 1996). 
An important implication of evolutionary change is that a system has so much 
diversity that it is extremely unlikely that it will revisit a previous state. In economics it is  
known as path dependence. In effect, it means that history is introduced. Indeed, a unique and 
important feature of evolutionary thinking is that it can integrate theory and history. As a 
result, evolution has turned out to be one of the most powerful ideas that science has 
generated, with a potentially very wide application area as well as synthesizing capacity 
(Ayres, 1994; Dennet, 1995). 
Evolutionary economics is very much the legacy of Joseph Schumpeter, who is 
without any doubt the most influential of all early evolutionary economists and who wrote 
much about growth-related issues. Schumpeter questioned the static approach of standard 
economics, and showed a great interest in the dynamics of economies, in particular the 
capitalist system, in all of his major works. He considered qualitative economic and 
technological change in a wider context of social change, focusing on the impact of the 
innovative ‘entrepreneur’ (Schumpeter, 1934: first published in German in 1911). Schumpeter 
regarded economic (capitalistic) change as the result of revolutionary forces from within the 
economy, which destroy old processes and create new ones: “creative destruction”. This 
allows for discrete or non-gradual changes, through clusters of derived innovations following 
a major invention. These themes were elaborated in his studies of business cycles (long 
waves). Schumpeter shares with Marx, Mill and Ricardo the general idea of a final steady 
state. In Schumpeter’s case, this state is characterized by technological progress as the result 
of carefully planned team research under a socialist organization of society. Like Marx, 
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Schumpeter gave thought to the process of change from the capitalist to the socialist 
economy. Although Schumpeter realized that discontinuities play a role, he did not assign to 
them the critical role that they have in Marx’s theory. Instead, he believed that political 
responses would lead to a gradual transition. 1 
 Since the 1950s, there has been a slow increase of publications on economic 
evolution. This can be partly explained by the success of evolutionary biology, the limits of 
neoclassical economics, and the search for evolutionary underpinnings of optimizing behavior 
as assumed by neoclassical economics. The most cited work since the 1950s has been that of 
Nelson and Winter (1982). The three building blocks of Nelson and Winter’s theory of 
microevolution are organization routines, search behavior and selection environment. A 
routine can be considered as the equivalent of the gene in biological evolution, having some 
durability and being subject to change due to selection. A routine consists of a complex set of 
skilled individuals. Interactions between them are crucial, and depend on earlier contacts 
(learning, adaptation) and organization-specific ‘language’. Routines create a constancy or 
continuity in the firm’s behavior, due to factors such as organizational politics, avoiding 
conflicts, vested interests, financial costs of change, and management control. Change in 
routines follows two routes, namely organized search through R&D and non-directed and 
accidental change due to solving problems in the organization’s performance – including old 
employees leaving and new ones entering. The framework supports bounded rationality as a 
general model, and suggests that deliberate choice with a given set of alternatives is a far cry 
from reality. 
Various other, authentically evolutionary approaches have been proposed — perhaps 
with less impact (so far), but not necessarily less relevant. The most important recent proposal 
concerning the direction evolutionary economics should follow is without any doubt Potts 
(2000). Potts presents a kind of axiomatic foundation of evolutionary economics. In his view, 
economic systems are complex “hyperstructures”, i.e. nested sets of connections among 
components. Economic change and growth of knowledge are in essence a process of changes 
in connections. New technologies, products, firms, sectors, and spatial structures arise that are 
more roundabout and complex than the old ones. Firm and economic growth are a process of 
creation of more complex organization, or new connections, as well as the grouping of those 
connections. In line with the idea of changing connections, Potts calls for a new 
microeconomics based on the technique of discrete, combinatorial mathematics, such as graph 
theory. This can be seen as support for multi-agent population models. 
                                                          
1 Given the social-welfare states in most western countries with a mixture of private and public activities, markets 
and social institutions to redistribute income, and labor markets, unions and legislation, it seems that Schumpeter 
was closer to the truth than Marx. Of course, this is not true for an international setting as well as for certain low 
developed countries. Here a rather pure form of capitalism is found, characterized by extremely skewed 
distributions of income and power. 
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 Neo-Schumpeterian theories of technical change currently dominate the evolutionary 
approach in economics (Dosi et al., 1988, Metcalfe, 1998). They regard innovation to cause 
asymmetry in technology among firms, sectors and countries, leading to exchange and trade. 
Comparative advantages are not fixed but change due to innovation and diffusion. Trade itself 
stimulates diffusion of knowledge. In addition, technological change affects the division of 
labor, the organization of intra-firm and inter-firm relationships, and thus the industrial 
structure and patterns of intermediate deliveries. Within the neo-Schumpeterian literature on 
technological evolution, the notion of path dependence has received much attention (Arthur, 
1989). This is a result of increasing returns, which may be due to learning by using, 
bandwagon demand side effects (imitation), network externalities (e.g. telecommunication), 
informational increasing returns (if more adopted, then better known), and technological 
interrelatedness or complementarity. A consequence of increasing returns, or path dependence 
to one of multiple potential equilibria, is that inefficient equilibria can arise and a certain 
(inefficient) technology can become locked-in.2  
A second current ‘school’, which is becoming more influential, is evolutionary game 
theory. It is also known as ‘equilibrium selection theory’, because it solves the problem of 
multiple Nash equilibria common in nonlinear economic equilibrium models (Friedman 
1998). Evolutionary game theory is analytical, and can be so due to the fact that it adopts an 
aggregate approach to describing evolutionary economic phenomena. Usually, two groups are 
distinguished, reflecting minimal diversity. Groups are considered to consist of identical 
individuals; in this sense, evolutionary game theory really is a compromise between 
representative agent and fully-fledged evolutionary models. Interactions among individuals 
and between individuals and their environment are usually described through an aggregate 
replicator equation. This formalizes the idea that individuals with above-average (below-
average) fitness will increase (decrease) their proportion in the population. Evolutionary 
games give rise to asymptotic equilibria, because no process of regular generation of diversity 
is assumed. As a result, selection completely dominates system dynamics. In other words, 
there is no interaction between innovation and selection, which makes evolution so 
characteristic and unique. A more suitable name for this approach theory would therefore be 
“selection game theory”. 
 
3. The intersection between evolutionary and environmental and resource economics 
Economic evolutionary theories are incomplete due to their neglect of environmental 
dimensions. Important phases of economic history cannot be well understood without 
                                                          
2 Evolutionary reasoning itself can be invoked to explain the slow spread of evolutionary thinking in economics. 
What follows then is that neoclassical economics is a case of lock-in at the level of scientific ideas. In fact, the 
Kuhnian notion of a paradigm is consistent with the notion of lock-in. 
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resorting to environmental or resource factors. The field of economics that focuses attention 
on these factors, environmental and resource economics, has been dominated by equilibrium 
theories in which individuals are assumed to maximize utility or profits, markets clear, and 
either no changes over time occur or they are of an aggregate and mechanistic type. This 
holds for the three core areas of environment policy theory, monetary valuation, and resource 
analysis. The recent adoption of the notion ‘sustainable development’ has meant a more 
explicit long-term focus, which can easily be regarded as an invitation to apply evolutionary 
perspectives, notably to address the complex role of structural and technological change in the 
conflict between economic growth and environmental preservation (Mulder and van den 
Bergh, 2001; Gowdy, 1999). Norgaard (1985) proposed to use the biological notion of 
coevolution as a joint and interactive evolution of nature, economy, technology, norms, 
policies and other institutional arrangements. Gowdy (1994) combines the notion of 
coevolution with macroevolutionary elements, noting that economic evolution is a process at 
multiple scales, which is consistent with hierarchical approaches to economic evolution.  
Recently, Munro (1997) has added evolutionary elements to the standard problem of 
renewable resource harvesting. The motivation is that harvesting not only affects the quantity 
of the resource but also its quality, or composition in genetic terms. Examples can be found in 
agriculture (monocultures, and the use of pesticides and herbicides), fisheries (mesh size, 
season of fishing), ecosystem management (control of groundwater level, fire protection), and 
health care (use of antibiotics). The genetic-selective effects of resource use and habitat 
destruction provide a link with concerns for biodiversity loss. Munro formulates a dynamic 
optimization problem based on the notion that the use of insecticides raises the fitness of 
resistant insects relative to their susceptible competitors. The optimal use of insecticide is 
influenced by the evolutionary-selective dynamics of the system. Compared with this, the 
traditional optimal plan, which neglects evolution, can be characterized as myopic, thus 
giving rise to a too high level of pesticide use.  
Much attention in environmental economics has been given to the risk of 
overexploitation of common property or common-pool resources, such as fisheries. Although 
common property is often confused with open access, where overexploitation is very likely, in 
common property resources the risk is also serious. It depends very much on the type of 
common property regime that is active, and may therefore differ from situation to situation. A 
fundamental question is whether it is useful to respond to resource conflicts and overuse with 
strict policies set by higher level governments, or that instead it would be better to rely on 
endogenous formation of use regimes. An evolutionary perspective has been used to analyze 
the latter, based on the idea that such regimes need to be sufficiently supported by the 
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individuals participating, or, in other words, that a single norm evolves. Many contributions to 
this literature suggest that externally-imposed rules and monitoring can reduce and destabilize 
co-operation, or even completely destroy it. Instead, it is preferable to have a norm supported 
by communication among the resource users. When monitoring is imperfect, results are even 
worse, and stimulating norms through communication is certainly more desirable than 
external regulation. The latter is only desirable if an effective system of monitoring and 
sanctions can be implemented. However, self-organization in its most fundamental and 
general form is probably still not entirely understood. For instance, the size of the respective 
group seems to be important, but it is not clear what determines a critical size for (emergent) 
properties, such as particular norms or institutions, to arise. Instability in the evolutionary 
equilibrium can arise when certain parameters change (e.g. the resource price), or rules are 
implemented by an external regulator. In the latter case, norms may erode, ultimately leading 
to resource extinction. Equilibrium can also breakdown when sanctions decrease, harvesting 
technology becomes more productive (technical progress), or the price of the resource 
increases (Ostrom 1990). These issues have been examined using a wide range of approaches, 
including analyses based on evolutionary game theory (Sethi and Somanathan, 1996; Noailly 
et al., 2003), laboratory experiments and empirical field studies. 
The examples given above suggest that environmental and resource economics have 
incorporated evolutionary elements. However, these examples are merely exceptions. 
Generally, environmental economics has neglected evolutionary issues, and evolutionary 
economics has neglected environmental issues (see further van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2000). 
 
4. Evolutionary growth theory 
This section aims to spell out the main assumptions and insights of evolutionary approaches 
to the analysis of economic growth, as well as to identify the main differences between 
endogenous and evolutionary growth theories. 
At the basis of an evolutionary theory of economic growth is the notion of a 
population of heterogeneous firms. This gives rise to differential growth, which can be seen as 
a change in the frequencies of all possible individual characteristics. Nelson and Winter 
(1982: part IV, in particular Chapter 9) developed the first formal evolutionary model of 
economic growth, which is compared with Solow’s famous descriptive growth model from 
1957. Its purpose is to generate and explain patterns of aggregate outputs, inputs and factor 
prices. Changes in the state of a sector follow probability rules, modeled as a Markov process 
with time dependent probabilities, that depend on search behavior, imitation, investments, 
entry and selection. If firms make sufficient profits, then they do not search or imitate others, 
otherwise they do. Search is local, implying small improvements and staying close to the 
present production technique. Imitation can focus on either the average or the best practice. 
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The output generated qualitatively resembles the real data used by Solow. Note that this 
evolutionary growth theory is based on the evolutionary theory of firms and industry structure 
proposed by Nelson and Winter, which consisted of routines, search and selection. 
A crucial concept in neoclassical (exogenous and endogenous) growth theory is the 
aggregate production function. Nelson and Winter argue that: “… movements along the 
production function into previously inexperienced regions – the conceptual core of the 
neoclassical explanation of growth – must be rejected as a theoretical concept.” Of course, the 
Cambridge capital debate had already assessed that it was a theoretical construct which gave 
rise to the internal inconsistency of growth theory (the implications for environmental 
economics are discussed in van den Bergh, 1999). Neither single firms nor the aggregate of 
all firms can move along an aggregate and continuous production function, because they 
possess only information or knowledge about a limited and discreet number of production 
techniques. This idea is also recognized by the neo-Austrian approach, which is formalized 
using an activity analysis type of model (Faber and Proops, 1990). The conclusion is that an 
aggregate production function, a standard and necessary element of neoclassical growth 
theory, is an artifact with no clear link to reality. It is certainly not in line with 
microfoundations (van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2003). Instead, evolutionary theories propose 
to avoid an aggregate production function and instead describe diversity of production 
relationships at the level of individual firms. 
Nelson and Winter criticize growth accounting for explaining only about 20% of 
productivity growth, based on movements along an aggregate production function due to 
factor input changes, and leaving 80% as unexplained residual, often cleverly referred to as 
‘technological change’, although sometimes partly attributed to environmental and resource 
factors. Instead, Nelson and Winter’s approach makes it possible to integrate the micro- and 
macro-aspects of technology and its change over time. It generates results that are consistent 
not only with firms’ decision making (routines, search), but also with empirical observations, 
such as aggregate data on factor level and efficiency features across sectors, and patterns of 
innovation and diffusion. 
 More recently, other formal evolutionary models of growth have been proposed 
(Conlisk, 1989; Silverberg et al., 1988). Conlisk works with a probability distribution of 
productivity of firms. The growth rate can be analytically derived as being dependent on the 
rate of diffusion of innovations and the size of innovations as indicated by the standard error 
of the productivity probability distribution. Silverberg et al. have proposed an evolutionary 
growth model that starts from the Goodwin model, which revolves around a formalization of 
the illustrious Philips curve that depicts the famous relation between wage change and 
unemployment level: the higher employment is, the higher the wage increase (inflation). The 
modeling of a population of a large number of firms and their behavior in terms of fixed rules 
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generates the industry dynamics. An important behavior rule is that new capital follows from 
profit accumulation, where profit is redistributed so that relatively profitable types of capital 
accumulate relatively fast. This can be regarded as selection, in that a technique with a 
relatively high fitness spreads quickly, combined with a growing ‘population of technologies’ 
through accumulation. In order to complete the evolutionary dimension of the model, 
selection is complemented by a mechanism of innovation. The introduction of new firms and 
technologies in the economy follows from firms undertaking R&D to improve labor 
productivity, the outcome of which is stochastic (a Poisson process). The stochastic character 
is a way to reflect extreme uncertainty associated with innovation – in the form of surprises 
and ignorance. Spillovers are taken into account, through which a firm can profit from other 
firms’ R&D, captured by economy-wide R&D. Firms can employ two strategies for 
innovation: mutation or imitation. The probability of imitation depends on the gap between 
the firms’ own profit rate and the maximum profit rate in the population. This follows the 
general model of innovation and imitation as developed by Iwai (1984). 
Empirical research on diversity has focused on the statistical analysis of country 
differences (Fagerberg, 1988). Important indicators used are input measures like R&D 
expenditures, and output measures like the rate of patenting. By combining these indicators 
with levels of productivity (income per capita), information clusters of countries can be 
identified. Some insights are that R&D and patenting turn out to be weakly correlated with 
productivity, that R&D does not guarantee successful patenting, and that growth rates can be 
inversely related to levels of productivity in the same period. The latter points to some catch-
up mechanism, i.e. the idea that technological gaps are closed through imitation. The general 
Schumpeterian non-equilibrium approach emphasizes the interaction between opposing 
forces, consistent with the accordion model (see Section 2): innovation that increases 
technological differences among countries; and imitation and diffusion that reduces such 
differences. 
 
Evolutionary versus endogenous growth theory 
Here the main similarities and differences between evolutionary and (neoclassical) 
endogenous growth theories are briefly discussed, because both explicitly address the fact that 
growth is fuelled by technical change (see the Chapter by Smulders in this volume).  
Both theories endogenize technical change (R&D) by using outlays on R&D as a core 
variable. Neoclassical theory defines R&D at the aggregate level. Evolutionary theory derives 
production as well as technical change from the population of firms, thus explicitly modeling 
R&D as being undertaken inside productive firms. 
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Related to this is the fact that neoclassical models depend crucially on an aggregate 
production function, thus reflecting macro-level theories, whereas evolutionary models start 
from firm populations, thus really reflecting micro-level theories. 
Because of  the population approach, evolutionary models can address behavioral and 
technical diversity or heterogeneity, whereas in neoclassical theories representative or 
identical agents are assumed. The latter is implicit in the argument that micro-level production 
functions can be replicated, resulting in constant returns to scale at an aggregate level (in the 
absence of positive R&D externalities). 
Evolutionary models further assume bounded rationality, usually in the form of 
routines and learning through imitation. Neoclassical models assume, by definition, individual 
rationality (marginal decision rules) and social (intertemporal) optimality. This explains the 
neoclassical growth theory focus on equilibrium growth paths, as opposed to the non-
equilibrium features of evolutionary growth. The approach of Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
incorporates some elements of heterogeneity and destructive or vertical innovation – creative 
destruction à la Schumpeter – in a neoclassical type of model, but maintains the assumption 
of the rational agent. Mulder et al. (2001) refer to this as a “neo-classical Schumpeterian 
approach”. 
Both theories can address uncertainty and irreversibility, although this is more 
common in evolutionary models. Evolutionary theories incorporate a particular type of 
irreversibility: namely, path-dependence (see Section 2). Neoclassical growth models, due to 
their level of aggregation, cannot address path-dependence, because it requires the use of a 
population model in which the distribution of characteristics follows a historical path, along 
which the distribution of characteristics (firms, technologies) irreversibly changes. Stochastic 
elements are common elements of evolutionary models, notably to specify the timing of 
innovations. 
Neoclassical endogenous growth theory focuses attention on public externalities in 
technological innovation through the public good nature of certain aspects of knowledge and 
technology. In contrast, evolutionary theory focuses attention on the barriers and delays of 
diffusion of innovations, as well as the imperfect nature of replication and diffusion. Note that 
imperfect imitation itself is a cause of innovation. 
As illustrated by Nelson and Winter (1982) and Conlisk (1989), evolutionary models 
can generate patterns quite close to those generated by neoclassical models with particular 
technological change assumptions. However, evolutionary growth models can generate other 
patterns as well as include more phenomena that are subject to public policy, such as diffusion 
(imitation) rates, firm-specific innovation factors, selection forces, and lock-in. Therefore, 
they can provide information about a wider set of policy instruments. 
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These insights are consistent with the general idea that evolution does not always 
imply growth, and vice versa. To see the first point, consider an evolutionary process in which 
the diversity of firms changes but the total output (in monetary or physical terms) is constant 
or even falling. The second point is illustrated by a (hypothetical) perfect replication of all 
productive activities in an economy, as is a common assumption underlying endogenous 
growth models. 
Due to its lack of structural change, neoclassical growth theory cannot address time 
horizons beyond several decades. Stiglitz (1997) has suggested a time horizon in the order of 
60 years. Seen from the perspective of long waves, traditional growth theory thus adopts a 
rather short time horizon. Note, for instance, that 60 years is about the periodicity of the 
Kondratieff cycle. Since evolutionary growth theory is suitable to deal with structural change, 
it can, in principle, be used to address longer time horizons. 
In summary, the most important feature of evolutionary growth models is that they 
keep track of structural changes underlying growth by analyzing ‘differential growth’. It is 
fair to say, however, that several of their ‘promises’ still need to be delivered. In addition, 
evolutionary growth analyses still suffer from ad hoc specifications or a lack of agreement on 
a common approach. 
 
5. Evolutionary growth, environmental quality and resource scarcity 
This section examines the implications of evolutionary growth theory for the debate on 
growth-versus-environment. Surprisingly, this debate and the recent related literature on 
sustainable development have neglected evolutionary considerations (Hofkes and van den 
Bergh, 1998). The dominant literature in economics on sustainable development focuses on 
deterministic equilibrium growth theory in which development is reduced to a non-historical 
and reversible process characterized by the accumulation of a one-dimensional capital stock 
(Toman et al., 1995). The following perspectives follow from evolutionary thinking. 
 In neoclassical economics, steady states and equilibria dominate. John Stuart Mill 
introduced the concept of a ‘stationary state economy’, which was later adapted to an 
environmental and resource context by Daly (1977). Evolutionary theory, however, suggests 
that sustainable development as a stationary state is unrealistic. Selection and innovation 
processes will continue to irreversibly change the structure of the economy, at the level of 
processes, products, firms, individuals, groups and regions. The economic focus on ‘weak 
sustainability’ and ‘sustainable growth’, allowing for a certain degree of substitution between 
economic capital and ‘natural capital’, may be a poor policy guide when uncertainty, 
irreversibility, and coevolution are taken into consideration (Ayres et al., 2001). 
As argued in the previous section, evolutionary theory can, in comparison with 
economic growth theory, be regarded to extend the time horizon of analyses beyond decades 
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and even centuries, which seems to be required by the goal of sustainable development. The 
need for a distant time horizon is especially relevant for research on climate change and 
biodiversity loss, as these are bound to significantly affect both natural and cultural-economic 
evolution. 
 Not surprisingly, climate change research is one of the few areas where (optimal) 
growth models have been actually ‘applied’ (Nordhaus, 1994), leading to considerable 
criticism (e.g. Demeritt and Rothman, 1999; Azar, 1998). The issues of uncertainty and 
irreversibility have been addressed in the traditional economic growth theory context by 
Kolstadt (1994), who added stochastic elements to Nordhaus’ “DICE” model. The main 
insight obtained is that economic irreversibility due to over-investment in greenhouse gas 
(GHG) abatement techniques is more worrisome than irreversibility of natural processes like 
GHG accumulation in the atmosphere, climate change and ecological impacts. This is 
understandable, given the focus on economic efficiency of economic growth in a very simple, 
aggregate economy, and the neglect of uncertainty caused by future economic development. 
 A few studies have pursued evolutionary modeling in this area. Janssen (1998) and 
Janssen and de Vries (1998) have incorporated evolutionary elements in climate modeling by 
allowing adaptive agents to change their behavioral strategies as a result of changing 
perspectives, as a response to persistent surprises in global climate, represented by the global 
mean temperature of the atmosphere. These perspectives include “hierarchist” – complete 
control orientation, “individualist” – adaptive management orientation, and, “egalitarian” – 
preventive management orientation. The distribution of these perspectives in the population of 
agents (voters in a democracy) is changed according to a selection process modeled as a 
replicator equation based on an agent’s fitness. This is a function of the difference or gap 
between expected temperature change and actual temperature change. In other words, when 
persistent surprises have occurred that cannot be made consistent with the initial perspective 
on the climate change system and problem, the agent’s perspective adapts. This approach 
therefore tries to address the lack of complete and correct understanding of climate issues. 
Faber and Proops (1990) propose a neo-Austrian approach with evolutionary 
elements, to emphasise the role of time. They allow for irreversibility of changes in the sector 
structure of the economy, for uncertainty and novelty, and for a teleological sequence of 
production activities (“roundaboutness”). The long-term relation between environment, 
technology and development is then characterized by three elements: 
• The use of non-renewable natural resources is irreversible in time, so that a technology 
based on this must ultimately cease to be viable. 
• Inventions and subsequent innovations lead to both more efficient use of presently used 
resources and substitution to resources previously not used. 
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• Innovation requires that a certain stock of capital goods with certain characteristics is 
built up. 
 
They construct a multisector model with the production side formulated in terms of activity 
analysis, which allows to study the effect of invention and innovation on the transition from a 
situation with simple to more complex or roundabout production activities. Roundabout 
activities use multiple technologies. For instance, food production has become more 
roundabout, moving from agriculture with labor, through agriculture with labor and capital, to 
a large food processing industry with many intermediate deliveries. This approach can be 
extended with the technology effects of resource scarcity as indicated above. It can then 
simulate economic and environmental history from a pre-industrial agricultural society to an 
industrial society using fossil fuels and capital. It allows for a combination of continuous 
changes in technological efficiency and discrete jumps in the number of sectors and 
interdependencies among sectors. 
An important question in the context of growth is whether technical innovation is 
subject to diminishing returns to scale? If one regards technical change as retrieving 
innovations from a limited set of potential innovations, then it would be subject to 
diminishing returns. One can, however, doubt whether this is true, notably when taking 
seriously the idea of Potts (2001) that evolution means additional connections and higher 
levels in systems. Hence, there does not seem to be a scarcity of innovations. Moreover, 
various strategies can counter diminishing returns, such as learning, enlarging the scale of 
activity, opening new markets, or seeking new applications. In addition, market mechanisms 
and profit seeking help solving problems of diminishing returns. When marginal returns from 
additional innovation and perfecting a product or process start to fall rapidly, firms will shift 
to new lines of R&D (product life cycle or technological regime; Nelson and Winter, 1982, 
p.258), be selected against (exit), or be taken over. 
 Some authors have argued that we already possess the technical knowledge to 
increase the efficiency of material and energy use by a factor of 4 to 10. Nevertheless, larger 
system changes seem necessary, which cannot be framed merely as design issues. Ehrlich et 
al. (1999) scrutinize the growth-optimist view that knowledge and technology increases will 
resolve environmental problems almost automatically. The journalist Horgan (1996) and the 
previous editor-in-chief of the highly respected journal Nature, Maddox (1998), present 
opposite views about the “knowledge explosion”, with Horgan claiming that the rate of 
important scientific discoveries is decreasing and Maddox representing an optimistic 
perspective. More researchers than ever are doing basic and applied research, and in 
connection with this there is more communication of important innovations through journals 
and the internet than ever, leading to new (re)combinations or connections. Ehrlich et al. 
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argue, however, that there is also much disinformation, i.e. information that is incorrect, 
inaccurate or not adding new insights, and even a loss of information due to loss of biological 
and cultural biodiversity and other lost options. 
 
Economic and environmental history from a coevolutionary angle 
In Section 2, it was argued that evolutionary economics allows us to link theory to history. 
This section tries to consider such a link in the context of growth and environment. 
 An initial model of long-run historical change and environmental degradation may 
focus on important socio-economic transitions in human history, such as from hunting and 
gathering to agriculture to industrial societies. These have been argued to be consistent with 
the evolutionary theory of punctuated equilibrium, although so far this is no more than a loose 
conceptual connection (Somit and Peterson, 1989; Gowdy, 1994). 
 Another notion that has been suggested in the context of long-run changes is coevolution. 
This reflects an integration of elements from ecology and evolutionary biology. Although 
initially used at the level of species interactions, coevolution has since been invoked to denote 
a range of interactions: biological-cultural, ecological-economic, production-consumption, 
technology-preferences, and human genetic-cultural (Norgaard, 1985; Durham, 1991; Gowdy, 
1994; van den Bergh and Stagl, 2003). An interesting typology of evolution comes from 
Durham (1991), who focuses on genetic-cultural interactions: 
1. Genetic mediation: Genetic changes affect cultural evolution.  
2. Cultural mediation: Cultural changes affect genetic evolution. 
3. Enhancement: Cultural change reinforces natural evolution. 
4. Opposition: Cultural change goes against natural evolution. 
5. Neutrality: Cultural change is independent of biological evolution or selection.  
 
According to Wilson (1998, p.128) “The quicker the pace of cultural evolution, the looser the 
connection between genes and culture, although the connection is never completely broken.” 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to prove that cultural change is independent from genes, since the 
indirect effects of certain aspects of culture on a population level cannot be easily traced 
empirically. 
The above classification might be generalized to other types of coevolution, including 
the interaction of evolutionary economic and ecological systems. It should be noted, however, 
that coevolution is often used in a loose manner, without including aspects of populations and 
diversity. 
Georgescu-Roegen (1971) identifies three technical ‘Promethean’ innovations that 
significantly altered the relationship between humans and their natural environment: fire, 
agriculture and the steam engine. It has been suggested that the invention of fire served to 
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lengthen the day and stimulated late evening communication among humans, thus 
contributing to social-cultural evolution. This process accelerated after the last Ice Age (about 
13,000 years ago), because of the development of sedimentary agriculture (the “Neolithic 
Revolution”), which led to the division of labor and specialization. Other major inventions, or 
“macromutations” (Mokyr 1990), include the windmill, the mechanical clock, the printing 
press, the casting of iron, the combustion engine, the airplane and the Green Revolution in 
agriculture.  
Environmental factors may have influenced crucial changes during the social-cultural 
history of humankind. Potential environmental factors of influence were: local and global 
climate, diversity of soil conditions, scarcity of fuels (notably fuelwood), and available local 
plants and animals with sufficient concentrations of proteins, carbon hydrates, fats and 
vitamins. Diamond (1997) summarises the literature that supports the theory that climatic 
change and the availability of animal and plant species stimulated early domestication and 
thus agriculture and settlements. Diamond (1997: Chapter 10) emphasizes that sufficient 
diversity of agricultural experimentation was only possible in continents whose major axis 
was east-west oriented, as this would allow for the spread of agricultural technologies among 
regions with similar climates. This then is an important reason for the early ‘economic 
success’ of Eurasia. Diamond’s theory thus explicitly relates early economic development to a 
combination of environmental-resource and geographical factors. 
Wilkinson (1973) has developed an ecological theory of economic development with 
which he attempts to relate the Industrial Revolution to natural resource factors. This theory 
recognizes a number of human strategies to respond to resource scarcity, such as using new 
techniques, exploration of new resources, product innovation, and migration. Wilkinson’s 
ideas imply an environmental perspective on the origins of the Industrial Revolution at the 
end of the 18th century. Agriculture and the use of fuelwood in iron smelting led to a loss of 
forest cover in England. A shortage of wood, reflected in a higher price, stimulated the early 
use of coal. Coal mining first occurred on outcrops at the surface, but soon shifted to deep 
mining. For this purpose groundwater needed to be pumped out, which meant the first serious 
application of the steam engine. Large-scale use led to the refinement of the steam engine, 
which in turn stimulated various spin-offs, notably in the textile industry and transport (ships, 
locomotives). 
In a recent article, Galor and Moav (2002, p1) argue that: “… the struggle for survival 
that had characterized most of human existence generated an evolutionary advantage to 
human traits that were complementary to the growth process, triggering the take-off from an 
epoch of stagnation to sustained economic growth.” This view fits in the “enhancement 
mode” of Durham’s coevolution discussed above. At first sight, one might think that unlike 
genetic evolution of certain physical features that depend on variations of a single or few 
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genes (lactose and gluten tolerance, sickle cell trait), the interaction between human genetic 
evolution and economic growth finds little support in evolutionary biology and theories of 
cultural evolution. The reason is that the evolution of human behavior involves so many genes 
that its timescale does not match that of economic growth. In particular, Galor and Moav’s 
view seems to overlook the fact that economic growth is a phenomenon that arose long after 
Homo Sapiens had evolved (at least several hundred thousand years ago), and even much later 
than the rise of agriculture (about 13,000 years ago). Significant economic growth did not 
actually arise until the end of the Middle Ages, and sustained growth not until the Industrial 
Revolution was set in motion some 300 years ago. 
Nevertheless, selection (and possibly recombination) effects may have changed the 
distribution of certain parental care characteristics, notably the trade-off between quantity of 
offspring and quality of parental care. In modern economic growth jargon, such quality 
improvements can be regarded as an early or even ancient type of investment in human 
capital. In particular, the gradual emergence of the smaller family since the rise of agriculture 
may have played an important role in this. Hitherto, larger groups, such as tribes built around 
one or more extended families, had a dominant influence on human evolution. Galor and 
Moav argue that human organization by way of smaller families fostered a strategy that 
focused relatively much attention on parental investment in quality of offspring, such as 
education. This, together with a sufficiently large size of the communicating human 
population, led, through technological innovation, to the essential impetus for the take-off of 
the Industrial Revolution. In other words, the authors propose an “endogenous evolutionary 
theory” of the Industrial Revolution. The selection pressure was effective during the 
preceding “Malthusian era” because the majority of people were living on a subsistence 
consumption level. 
One explanation that the authors cannot exclude, however, is that the change in parental 
care has culturally rather than genetically evolved. This implies that the theory needs to be 
tested empirically, probably a difficult, if not impossible task. But perhaps this is not a really 
worrisome problem, because the theory works in quite a similar way for both cultural and 
genetic selection, and may even be formulated to include both. Finally, since the Industrial 
Revolution, the evolutionary incentives have changed, among other things, through 
institutionalized educational systems and requirements, as well as through incomes and 
consumption levels far exceeding subsistence levels. As a result, a new evolutionary regime 
applies nowadays, at least in the developed part of the world. 
A complete view of macro-history involves, as well as growth trends, cycles or long 
waves.  Long waves are caused by major shifts in methodology, due to fundamental advances 
in science. A rough classification of waves since the Industrial Revolution is shown in Table 
1. Long waves have been accompanied by a number of changes. Among other things, the 
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average size of firm has increased; the research (R&D) and innovation process has changed 
from firm to international levels; firm interactions and industry structure have altered; and, 
new key resources and related production sectors have appeared. In addition, each period has 
it peculiar environmental impacts, as illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Environmental and resource aspects of long waves 
Phase Key resources Main environmental impacts 
Hunter and gatherers Wild animals and plants Forest fires 
Early agriculture Solar energy Soil erosion 
Late Middle Ages Wind, water Local desiccation and water 
pollution 
Early Industrial Revolution Coal Urban pollution 
Steam power and railways Coal Factory pollution of water and 
air, large-scale infrastructure 
Mass production Oil, synthetics, heavy metals, 
fertilizers 
Factory and car-related  (noise, 
exhaust pollution, road 
infrastructure), toxic substances, 
acid rain 
Second half  20th century Oil, gas, heavy metals, tropical 
wood 
Biodiversity loss, global 
warming 
Future Genetic resources, water ? Genetic pollution, climate 
change, large-scale extinctions ? 
 
6. Progress and policy in an evolutionary growth context 
This section briefly addresses two questions: namely, whether growth can be considered as 
progress from an evolutionary perspective, and which environmental policy suggestions 
follow from evolutionary analysis. 
The crucial question of whether evolution is identical to progress has no simple 
answer. An important reason is that evolutionary progress has been defined in many different 
ways (see Gowdy, 1994: Chapter 8; Gould, 1988; Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995): 
• Increasing diversity: Diversity is often considered to entail evolutionary potential or 
adaptive capacity in the face of environmental change. 
• Increasing complexity: This can apply to the number of components, the number of 
connections among components, and the levels of nesting of such connections (Potts, 
2000).  
• New ways of transmitting information: In the economy, communication has gone through 
various phases: walking, horse, carriage, ship, train, car and plane, and telegraph, phone, 
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fax, and e-mail and Internet. The result is a larger population of communicating 
individuals. 
• More extended division of labor: One aspect of the increase in complexity is a trend 
towards the extended division of labor, within natural as well as social-economic 
evolution. 
• Population growth: From an evolutionary perspective, a species is successful if it 
dominates competitors, meaning dominance in ecosystems and control of its direct 
environment. This often goes along with growth in the size of population(s). 
• Increasing efficiency of energy capture or transformation: Both in economic and 
biological systems, evolution can be related to energy processes (Buenstorf, 2000). From 
an ecological-evolutionary perspective, a rise in energy efficiency means less scarcity and 
less selection pressure, thus creating opportunities for (population) growth. Schneider and 
Kay (1994) state that open natural and economic systems tend evolve into more complex 
arrangements, so as to improve energy degradation and dissipation. This involves more 
energy capture, more cycling of energy and material, more complex structure, more 
energy stocking (biomass) and more diversity. 
 
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995) suggest that evolutionary history is better 
depicted as a branching tree rather than progress on a linear scale. There are indeed many 
reasons why evolution does not lead to progress (extending Campbell 1996, p.433): 
1. Selection is a local search process, which leads at best to a local optimum and does not 
guarantee to generate a global optimum. 
2. Organisms are locked into historical constraints. In economics, this is treated under the 
headings of path-dependence and lock-in (Arthur, 1989).  
3. Adaptations are often compromises between different objectives, being stimulated by a 
multitude of selection forces.  
4. Not all evolution is adaptive: randomness, (molecular) drift, coincidental founder effects, 
etc. all play an important role. In addition, macroevolution creates boundary conditions 
for adaptation and may destroy outcomes of evolution, i.e. in a way, set time back 
(‘initialize’). 
5. Coevolution means adaptation to an adaptive environment. All straightforward notions of 
static or dynamic optimization are then lost; or, in the adaptive landscape metaphor, it 
means that the landscape changes underneath adaptive agents. 
 
Sen (1993) notes that evolution as improving species does not imply improving the 
welfare or quality-of-life of each individual organism. Fitness is not a useful criterion for 
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human progress, as it does not imply a happier or more pleasant life. Moreover, evolution as 
continuous change in diversity implies that inequality will arise again and again. 
Distributional change and inequality are inherent to evolution. Repeated selection for fitness 
implies that populations and species are continually stimulated to improve their fitness, since 
otherwise they are taken over by others (known as the “Red Queen hypothesis”; Strickberger, 
1996, p.511). The relevance for economic growth can be seen by noting that welfare beyond 
(basic) needs is to a large extent relative, dependent upon the income and other features of 
individuals in a reference group. Without significantly changing the distribution of these 
features among individuals, economic growth is not necessarily equivalent with progress. 
 
Policy issues 
A fundamental consequence of evolutionary features like bounded rationality, non-
equilibrium and path-dependence is that the normative part of neoclassical economics no 
longer holds. In particular, the correspondence of the market equilibrium and social welfare 
optimum (Pareto efficiency), formalized in the two fundamental theorems of welfare 
economics, is lost. This means that it is impossible to formulate an ideal blueprint of 
economic reality, to be implemented through planning or market approaches – since 
equilibrium theory on its own does not lead to a preference for either. Bounded rationality or 
alternative models of individual behavior lead to various particular policy suggestions that 
deviate from the standard economic theory of environmental policy (van den Bergh et al., 
2000). 
Evolutionary analysis of growth leads to a number of specific policy insights. A first 
one relates to technology. This includes instruments stimulating inventions, innovation and 
diffusion of technologies. In addition, two questions arise: How do regime shifts occur? And, 
how can they be stimulated? Linked to this is the specific problem of how to avoid lock-in of 
inefficient or undesired technologies, or, once this has occurred, how to ‘unlock’. Preventing 
early lock-in requires portfolio investment. The unlocking of undesired policies – e.g. from an 
environmental perspective – cannot be realized by ‘correcting prices’, but requires a 
combination of policies from the following set: 
• Reduce policy uncertainty. 
• Set clear overall goal: ‘zero emission’ California. 
• Correct selective pressures: car technology. 
• Create semi-protected niches: solar energy. 
• Stimulate pathway technologies: energy storage. 
• Stimulate diversity of R&D. 
• Stimulate complementary technologies. 
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• Strive for technologies with flexible design and multiple options. 
• Communicate with stakeholders to create a broad basis for learning and selection. 
 
Creating a general goal and policy environment, such as in the case of the Zero Emission 
Mandate of California, can be regarded to provide a much stronger incentive for innovation 
than traditional environmental policy. Given the high degree of uncertainty faced by 
innovators, policy making should aim more at creating clear long-term goals and contexts, 
including at the global level. 
A general strategy that derives from evolutionary reasoning is that, to assure adaptive 
potential in the face of changing environmental conditions, variety at various levels should be 
fostered: firms, technology, knowledge, R&D efforts, and ‘schools’ in science. Fisher’s 
theorem is worthwhile mentioning here: “The greater the genetic variability upon which 
selection for fitness may act, the greater the expected improvement in fitness” (Strickberger, 
1996, p.510). This theorem also explains why the propensity for variability will itself improve 
through repeated selection, i.e. variability itself is selected (Strickberger, idem). Focusing on a 
single best-available-technologies (BAT) is risky from this perspective, as knowledge about 
potential changes and impacts is always incomplete, and as it contributes to a lock-in of the 
BAT. 
Evolutionary policy implications are not necessarily counter to, but are often 
overlapping with and complementary to, traditional policy implications. For instance, price 
based instruments, focusing on ‘dynamic efficiency’, are insufficient. Of course, if prices do 
not reflect positive or negative ,externalities too little R&D will be undertaken and lock-in 
will be reinforced. However, much more than price policy is needed to guide R&D and help 
unlocking. In the context of R&D policy, the trade-off between appropriability of the benefits 
of inventions and diffusion of inventions leads to the need for their patentability. Avoiding 
early lock-in of technologies with uncertain social and environmental effects requires, in 
addition to the above measures, policies to stimulate fair competition. Market structure has 
received much attention, both in neoclassical and evolutionary theory. Both theories 
recognize that large firms with market power, monopolies or oligopolies, are essential to 
generate R&D at such a scale as is necessary for certain types of innovations. The combined 
need for sufficient appropriability (market power) and diversity (competition) of R&D leads 
to a preference for an oligopolistic (supply side of the) market.3 Note that the liberalization of 
energy markets, currently pursued by many countries, may be inconsistent with this insight, 
and may in fact slow down the pace of innovations in renewable energy technologies. 
                                                          
3 Nelson and Winter (p.390), however, note that an oligopolistic market may also combine the worst features of 
monopoly and competition, notably since much R&D tends to be defensive, i.e. focused on imitating competitors. 
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Beyond a certain innovation scale, governments have to take control of R&D, through 
universities. This results in the link between R&D and profit making becoming too indirect or 
uncertain. Basic (university) research provides the basis of major technological changes, such 
as pathway technologies (macromutations, long waves), and can help avoid entering a path of 
diminishing returns. Relevant innovations from an environmental perspective are: 
decentralized energy production based on renewables (solar and wind energy); precision-
biological agriculture and genetic technology; low pressure/temperature chemistry relying on 
catalysis; nanotechnology (dematerialisation, waste and emission reduction); and, battery 
electric vehicles. In addition, social or organizational innovations may need governmental 
support, such as car share or mixed car-public transport systems.4 Pathway technologies, 
which have a large impact on many development and activities through connections to all 
kinds uses and other technologies, deserve much attention. For instance, energy storage is 
important, as it supports renewable energy use, solutions to electricity peak demand, and zero 
emissions car technology. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Evolutionary growth theory cannot be developed by simply incorporating new elements in 
existing growth theory, but requires a completely different set of assumptions. As opposed to 
evolutionary growth theory, exogenous and endogenous neoclassical growth theories are 
really macro-theories that lack explicit micro-relationships. The aggregation problem implies 
that there is no unique mapping from micro- to macro-level relationships. This is most clearly 
illustrated by the specification of an aggregate production function and an aggregate 
cumulative innovation indicator. The evolutionary perspective, on the other hand, starts from 
micro-level descriptions of populations of firms that work according to routines, search and 
selection. This results in non-equilibrium, differential growth with continuous interaction 
between innovation and selection of diversity. This in turn leads to a more intricate, as well as 
a more long-run relationship between resource scarcity, environmental conditions and 
economic growth than presented by neoclassical growth. A selection of insights is as follows: 
• Growth is virtually always based on underlying structural change, at the level of changing 
distributions of technologies and firms. The long-run relationship between the economy 
and the environment needs to take explicit account of such structural economic changes, 
                                                          
4 In addition, governments can change the selection environment for car producers: for example, through technical 
limits on motor size, speed and acceleration power. This would stimulate technological innovations leading to 
slower and lighter cars. This would have several advantages. Besides less use of materials and energy in 
production, less energy would be involved in collisions. This in turn might shift the attention in car construction 
from ‘inside or passenger safety’ or ‘single car safety’ to ‘system safety’: namely, by taking into account 
interactions among all cars. Against this background, relatively heavy cars imply a potential risk or a negative 
externality to other road users, and should as much as possible be banned or be subjected to an appropriate 
externality tax. 
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as these can lead to new patterns and interactions, which possibly can offer solutions to 
pressing environmental and resource problems that cause unsustainable growth. 
• Scarcity of (energy or material) resources and environmental regulation directly affect the 
distribution of firm and technology characteristics, and indirectly aggregate economic 
activity. Since economic agents in evolutionary theory are characterized by bounded 
rationality, they will inefficiently use resources and environmental opportunities, as well 
as imperfectly grasp available opportunities for substitution of scarce by less scarce 
resources. Moreover, environmental regulation will not lead to optimal social welfare. 
Further, evolutionary insights are that transitions away from inefficient or outdated to new 
technologies are severely hampered or at best delayed by technological and organisational 
lock-in. All in all, the evolutionary perspective on environmental and resource limits to 
growth is much less optimistic than one based on neoclassical growth-cum-environment 
analysis. 
• In addition, one should consider the issue of returns to technical change. If one regards it 
as retrieving innovations from a limited set of potential innovations, then it would be 
subject to diminishing returns. If, however, evolution is seen as ‘additional connections’ 
or more complex technologies and organizations, then there is not an obvious limit to 
innovations. However, it may be the case that more complex systems become less stable 
and more difficult to handle and maintain. Moreover, they may require more and more 
education from inventors and technicians, which is limited by the time available in an 
individual’s life. Then fruitful innovations become increasingly scarce. Further, the tempo 
with which innovations arrive may go down. 
• Major historical transitions, such as the rise of agriculture and the Industrial Revolution, 
have been influenced by environmental and resource conditions. The notion of 
coevolution is relevant for both historical and future growth analysis. This notion reflects 
that both the economy and the environment consist of diverse elements that change 
through innovation and selection, and are, moreover, interactive: the economy is adaptive 
to the environment and vice versa. 
• Evolutionary growth is not identical with progress. Coevolution, local adaptation, and 
path dependence, among other things, suggest that evolution, at best, is caught in a local 
optimum. Furthermore, progress does not only depend on the absolute or average size of 
the economy (per capita) but also on changes in distribution, which are inevitable. Mere 
income growth is a too crude indicator to capture the wide variety of structural changes in 
an evolving economy. 
• Changes in population distributions of technology give rise to path dependence, a 
historical process, which in turn can create the problem of lock-in of an undesirable 
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technology. Path-dependence and lock-in require a different approach than that suggested 
by the economic theory of environmental policy. Decentralized policy based on 
externality taxation (price regulation) is generally insufficient to unlock the system, 
except in the rare case where the marginal external cost is so high that the regulated price 
becomes prohibitive. Comparative statics results, which are common in equilibrium 
economics, provide insufficient information about which policy is needed, as desired 
equilibrium states may not be reachable from the present state. 
• Because evolution means that the link between a social optimum and a market 
equilibrium is lost, optimal social welfare policies play a less central role in evolutionary 
economics than they do in neoclassical economics. On the other hand, evolutionary 
theory, due to its focus on population diversity, can better address distribution issues than 
neoclassical economics. 
 
The present chapter has introduced a range of evolutionary economic ideas, which, 
although not elaborated in great detail, together suggest a fresh perspective on the relationship 
between growth, environment and resource scarcity. Evidently, further theoretizing, modeling 
and empirical research are needed. Given the small number of studies in this area, the added 
value of this line of research is expected to be very high.
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